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Abstract 
Human cognition is not limited to the processing of events in the external 
environment, and the covert nature of certain aspects of the stream of consciousness 
(e.g. experiences such as mind-wandering) provides a methodological challenge. 
Although research has shown that we spend a substantial amount of time focused on 
thoughts and feelings that are intrinsically generated, evaluating such internal states, 
purely on psychological grounds can be restrictive. In this review of the different 
methods used to examine patterns of ongoing thought, we emphasise how the 
process of triangulation between neuroimaging techniques, with self-reported 
information, is important for the development of a more empirically grounded account 
of ongoing thought. Specifically, we show how imaging techniques have provided 
critical information regarding the presence of covert states and can help in the 
attempt to identify different aspects of experience. 
Keywords: MRI, EEG, ERP, connectivity, mind-wandering, self-generated thoughts.  
  
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3 
 
1. Why use neuroimaging methods to study ongoing thought? 
Cognition is not always focused on the events taking place in the environment, we 
often spend large periods of time immersed in thoughts that are generated 
intrinsically. A common example of such a self-generated experiential state is the 
experience of mind-wandering where, instead of processing information from the 
external environment, one’s attention is directed toward internal thoughts, feelings 
and personal reflections (Seli et al., 2018). Research suggests that mind-wandering 
takes up anywhere from a third to half of our mental life (Kane et al., 2007), has an 
impact on everyday life activities (Cowley, 2013; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009) and 
has been observed across multiple cultures (Deng, Li, & Tang, 2012; Levinson, 
Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009; Song & Wang, 
2012; Tusche, Smallwood, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2014). 
 By nature, therefore, ongoing thought is subject to a continuous evolution 
across time, and these changes can often occur in a covert manner (Smallwood, 
2013). While techniques such as experience sampling (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 
1987) make it possible to estimate participants’ thoughts and feelings as they occur, 
providing an ‘online’ measure of experience, this data relies on subjective self-
reports, rather than objective measurements. By comparison, although behavioural 
indices of ongoing thought may be less subjective because they provide measures of 
the observable consequences associated with performing dull, monotonous tasks, 
studies suggest that there is not a one to one mapping between slips of action and 
patterns of off-task thought (Konishi, Brown, Battaglini, & Smallwood, 2017). The 
limitations of both subjective and behavioural indices, therefore, make it a challenge 
to establish a mature scientific account of ongoing thought.  
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This review considers the advantages that can be gained when patterns of 
ongoing thought are examined using the strategy of triangulation whereby self-
reports, behavioural measures, and neurocognitive measures are used in concert 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). We will argue that neuroimaging tools are important 
for understanding two aspects of ongoing thought. In particular, the tools of cognitive 
neuroscience (i) can provide insight into whether experience is focused externally or 
internally and (ii) will help determine the different forms that experiences can take 
with consideration of the underlying mechanisms. Before considering how 
neuroimaging can be combined with subjective measures of ongoing thought, this 
review will briefly consider the different methods of experience sampling, with a 
specific aim to consider their strengths and weaknesses in studies of neuroimaging 
(see Figure 1., a flow chart describing the analytical decisions guiding the use of 
neuroimaging technics in the investigation of ongoing thought).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 – FLOW CHART]. 
2. Methodology of measuring ongoing thought 
Although ongoing thought is a challenge to study, experience sampling remains the 
gold standard measure for identifying the explicit contents of consciousness 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). There are a number of different methods of 
estimating patterns of ongoing thought and here we highlight the different self-report 
methods that can be combined with neuroimaging techniques. 
2.1. Self-report Methods 
There are three basic methods of experience sampling that are used in studies of 
ongoing thought: online experience sampling, retrospective experience sampling, 
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and assessment of disposition. Online experience sampling involves gathering self-
reports regarding a participant’s ongoing experience ‘in the moment’ while they are 
completing other activities. The probe-caught method requires participants to be 
intermittently interrupted, often while performing a task, and are asked to describe 
the content of their experience (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Within this area of 
research there are two main methods of analysis. One gains open reports from the 
participants which are then coded based on predefined characteristics, for example 
whether they are related to the task, or aspects of their content (Baird, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2011; Hulburt, Mathewson, Bochmann, & Carlson, 2006; Smallwood, 
Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003). Other approaches require that participants 
answer questions that probe specific aspects of experience such as its level of 
deliberation (Seli, Ralph, Konishi, Smilek, & Schacter, 2017) or its level of awareness 
(Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007).  A second type of online experience 
sampling is the self-caught method where participants are asked to spontaneously 
report their mind-wandering episodes at the moments they are noticed (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). In such paradigms, participants are asked to press a button when 
noticing that their mind has drifted away from the task at hand. Both types of online 
experience have the advantage of being able to determine the patterns of thought 
taking place at a specific moment in time.  
Experience can also be sampled at the end of a task. In this approach, self-
reported data is gathered retrospectively at the end of a task or a block of trials, 
rather than in the moment. Smallwood and Schooler (2015) refer to this as 
retrospective sampling as it involves gathering estimations of experiences 
immediately after the task has been completed. The advantage of this method is that 
it preserves the natural time course of ongoing thought, as participants do not need 
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to be interrupted to report their experience. Retrospective, end of task estimations of 
mind-wandering may be gathered via single questions at the end of a task, via 
questionnaires (e.g. the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire, DSSQ; Matthews, 
Joyner, Gilliland, & Campbell, 1999), using the New York Cognition Questionnaire 
(Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018) or through open-ended 
questions. As retrospective measures do not interrupt the dynamics of cognition, their 
combination  with online measures of neural function provides a promising way to 
understand the broader temporal dynamics of experience, using techniques that 
exploit temporal changes in neural signals such as functional connectivity (Biswal, 
Deyoe, & Hyde, 1996), hidden Markov modelling (Vidaurre, Smith, & Woolrich, 2017) 
or sliding window analysis (Kucyi, Hove, Esterman, Hutchison, & Valera, 2017). 
However, a weakness of the retrospective approach is that this method relies on 
memory, making it impossible to relate self-reported data to a specific moment in 
time. Table 1 presents a summary of the different questionnaires that are available 
for use in both the online and retrospective domains. 
As originally suggested by Eric Klinger (Klinger & Cox, 1987) and Jerome 
Singer (for a review see McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013; Singer, 1975), an 
emerging body of evidence has found that ongoing experience is heterogeneous with 
multiple distinct types of experience that may each have unique cognitive profiles 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). In this context, it has become important to 
assess  multiple dimensions of experience at the same time (Golchert et al., 2017; 
Karapanagiotidis, Bernhardt, Jefferies, & Smallwood, 2017; Konishi et al., 2017; 
Medea et al., 2016; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, 
Sackur, & Singer, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2016; Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018; Wang, 
Poerio, et al., 2018). This approach is often described as Multi-Dimensional 
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Experience Sampling (MDES; Shrimpton, McGann, & Riby, 2017; Smallwood et al., 
2016) and allows the experimenter to simultaneously capture different aspects of 
experience allowing their heterogeneity to be empirically evaluated. Neuroimaging 
methods are particularly important in this regard because it remains unclear whether 
different types of experience can share underlying neural features (as would be 
expected if common cognitive processes are important in multiple different types of 
experience). In this context, neuroimaging techniques are important because they 
raise the possibility of objectively identifying whether similar neural regions are 
involved in different states (e.g. through the analysis of spatial conjunction). For 
example, Smallwood et al. (2016) found that multiple different aspects of experience 
- thoughts related to different temporal periods, off-task thoughts, and thoughts with 
vivid detail were associated with stronger connectivity at rest between regions of the 
temporal lobe and the posterior cingulate cortex. This observation has important 
consequences for neurocognitive accounts of different types of experience emerge 
because they illustrate that multiple types of experience may depend on similar brain 
regions. 
It is also possible to measure dispositional differences in patterns of ongoing 
thought using questionnaires that map traits linked to different types of experience. 
For example, the Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI; Huba, Singer, Aneshensel & 
Antrobus, 1982), the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ; Mrazek, Phillips, 
Franklin, Broadway, & Schooler, 2013), and the Mind-Wandering Deliberate and 
Spontaneous scale (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015) 
are all individual difference measures which ask participants to assess the 
characteristics of their daydreams or mind-wandering experiences in the context of 
their daily functioning. Similar to end of task estimation measures, this method relies 
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on retrospective judgements concerning previous mind-wandering experiences rather 
than online reporting. However, when these measures are used, participants have to 
think back over a longer period of time when reporting their experience and this 
presents greater risk of biases in reporting.  
These different types of experience sampling enable researchers to investigate 
the role of individual differences on laboratory-based mind-wandering tasks and 
gather information regarding general patterns of ongoing thought in the real world, 
making them more ecologically valid. Interestingly, different characteristics can be 
found between experience sampling in the laboratory and in daily-life (Kane et al., 
2017). While each approach has weaknesses, in combination, they offer the potential 
to refine our understanding of the nature of ongoing thought. For example, measures 
of typical mind-wandering styles have been successfully associated with experience 
sampling, giving insight about the association between temporal focus and self-
related thoughts (Shrimpton et al., 2017), and the verification of differences in 
spontaneous and deliberate mind-wandering both through associations with ADHD 
(Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015) and in the brain (Golchert et al., 2017). 
2.2. Behavioural Methods 
Building on evidence that certain forms of experience are linked to measures of 
performance on a task, research has also focused on the possibility that behavioural 
markers could provide additional insight into the processes underlying different 
aspects of experience. Often this involves examining performance on tasks that 
encourage the onset of mind wandering in the first place and one in which the 
occurrence of the experience is likely to have a consequence for performance. 
Examining the consequence of a particular covert state in this manner has a long 
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history in psychology where direct measurement is not possible. For instance, when 
examining the cost of dual tasking on everyday memory, measures are not only 
made on the secondary task but also on the primary task (Huang & Mercer, 2001). 
Here, one can consider the ongoing activity of self-generated thoughts as a primary 
task, which will impact one’s performance on the secondary task. As such, by 
measuring the secondary task, one gains information about the primary task, namely 
the self-generation of thoughts (Teasdale et al., 1995; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & 
Baddeley, 1993). One of the first examples of this procedure was a study by 
Teasdale et al., (1993) who showed that during a task of random number generation, 
the occurrence of off-task thoughts were linked to periods when the participant had 
begun to generate more predictable series of digits (Teasdale et al., 1995). Episodes 
of poorer performance on this secondary task, for example in terms of accuracy, 
false alarms, or reaction time variability are assumed to signal the occurrence of 
patterns of ongoing thought that are not related to efficient performance of the task. 
This technique has been applied to a wide range of different task paradigms and 
demonstrated that periods of off-task thought are linked to worse performance on 
tasks measuring encoding (Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003), 
reading (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008), working memory (Kane et al., 
2007), and intelligence (Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012).  
A task that has frequently been used to both encourage and measure mind-
wandering is the Sustained Attention Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). This requires participants to respond as quickly 
as possible to frequent and relevant stimuli (e.g., ‘press the space bar when the letter 
X appears’) whilst inhibiting their responses to infrequent stimuli (e.g. ‘do nothing 
when the letter Y appears’). One advantage of this method is that researchers may 
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use it to manipulate the prevalence of mind wandering by varying the demands of the 
task. For example, in an investigation into the effect of glucose on mind-wandering, 
Birnie, Smallwood, Reay, and Riby (2015) found that probed self-reports of mind-
wandering were associated with false alarms on the SART (i.e., erroneously pressing 
the response key to the infrequent stimuli). Furthermore, this association was 
stronger on easier trials of the SART, supporting the inference that mind-wandering 
is more prevalent when the demands of the ongoing tasks are low. The use of the 
SART in the literature is extensive and has uncovered important mind-wandering 
consequences such as increased reaction times before errors and decreased 
reaction time after errors, which is particularly true in ageing (Jackson & Balota, 
2012). Additionally, a variation of the original task extended the findings to the 
auditory modality (Seli, Cheyne, Barton, & Smilek, 2012). Notably, Seli et al. (2013) 
developed the metronome task, which involves responding synchronously (via button 
presses) with a continuous rhythmic presentation of tones, and demonstrated 
behavioural variability in the responses as a marker of mind wandering. 
Although sustained attentional tasks such as the SART have been used 
extensively in the mind wandering literature, it has received recent criticism regarding 
its precision in measuring both sustained attention and the likelihood of mind 
wandering (Dillard et al., 2014). Problematically the SART does not include any 
control condition or baseline, therefore preventing researchers from a clear 
interpretation of the variation in mind-wandering rates (see the paradigm from 
Konishi, McLaren, Engen, & Smallwood, 2015). In view of this, a variant of the 
cognitive task used by Konishi et al. (2015) is increasingly being used to both 
encourage and measure mind wandering. In this n-back paradigm, participants 
alternate between blocks of trials in which they either make decisions about the 
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location of shapes, which are currently available to the senses (0-back) or with 
respect to their location on a prior trial (1-back). Unlike the SART, the n-back task 
makes it possible to manipulate the demands of the task, with an increase in working 
memory load during the 1-back trials, which leads to a greater focus on task-relevant 
information. This task has been useful in understanding how the occurrence of off-
task thought in the easier 0-back but not the 1-back task, is related to an increased 
capacity to delay gratification (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 
2013). More recently it has been used to document patterns of neural activity that 
support a range of different experiential states (e.g. Sormaz et al., 2018). 
One specific area where the tools of neuroimaging could be valuable in moving 
forward our understanding of patterns of ongoing thought is by helping to identify the 
neural processes that are common to both errors in performance, and to patterns of 
off-task thinking. Studies have shown for example that both reading comprehension 
and the frequency of off-task thought are related to systematic variations in the 
connectivity of the Default Mode Network (Smallwood, Gorgolewski, et al., 2013). 
Such findings, provide a potential explanation for why off-task thought can interfere 
with our ability to read for comprehension (Smallwood et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, studies that have simultaneously assessed both performance and experience 
while neural activity has been recorded have revealed dissociations between the 
neural activity associated with patterns of off-task thinking form those linked to 
behaviour (Kucyi, Esterman, Riley, & Valera, 2016). Moving forward, the tools of 
neuroimaging may be helpful in assessing the underlying processes that help reveal 
the processes that describe the association between patterns in off-task thinking and 
performance, and this in turn will inform our understanding of why off-task thoughts 
can interfere with performance.  
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2.3. Interim summary 
Both subjective and behavioural indicators of experience provide formal evidence of the 
nature of ongoing thought either at a specific moment of time or in a particular task or 
condition. However, these measures offer only a superficial description of the nature of 
experience, and in particular, in isolation, these measures will struggle to provide evidence 
on underlying causal mechanisms. Recent work has begun to overcome this limitation by 
combining self-reported data with measures of neuroimaging, an approach that has been 
useful in two different domains: i) the quantifying periods of internal focus and ii) the 
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understanding of the heterogeneous nature of ongoing experience (see 
 
Figure 1). 
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3. Quantifying internal focus 
One area in which neuroimaging has helped move forward studies of ongoing 
thought is through the quantification of periods when the focus of ongoing thought 
shifts from the processing of external sensory input, known as perceptual decoupling 
(Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2013). These studies have largely used Event-
Related Potentials (ERPs) generated from the Electroencephalogram (EEG). ERP 
has proven to be a particularly valuable tool for evaluating the level of perceptual 
engagement during different types of ongoing thought. Sensory information is 
processed relatively fast, within 150 to 200 milliseconds, and described by evoked 
components known as the P1 and N1. While N1 has been found to be sensitive to 
auditory stimuli type and presentation predictability, P1 may reflect the “cost of 
attention” (Luck, Heinze, Mangun, & Hillyard, 1990). Elsewhere, P1 and N1 have 
been used to indicate, respectively, the attentional filtering and categorization of 
perceptual information before integrating semantic knowledge (Klimesch, 2011, 
2012), and the operation of a discrimination process when judgements about the 
stimuli are needed (Vogel & Luck, 2000). Interestingly, these components are found 
to be attenuated following reports of task-unrelated-thought (Baird, Smallwood, Lutz, 
& Schooler, 2014; Kam et al., 2010). The reduction of the amplitude of ERPs that are 
linked to early sensory processing is suggestive of a reduction of brain-evoked 
response to sensory input (Baird et al., 2014). In particular, data such as these 
suggest that the processing of relatively basic perceptual input information is reduced 
during certain types of internal focus. 
The study of a later component, the P3 (occurrence between 250 and 500 
milliseconds post-stimulus), is assumed to reflect the engagement of attentional 
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processes and studies have shown that this is linked to a reduction in amplitude 
during periods of off-task thought compared to being task focused (Barron, Riby, 
Greer, & Smallwood, 2011; Kam et al., 2012, 2010; Kam & Handy, 2013; Smallwood, 
Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2007). Given the well-documented role of the P3 in 
attentional processes, these data suggest that periods of off-task thought are linked 
to changes in attentionally mediated task sets. However, studies have shown that 
this process reflects a switch away from the task goals, rather than a failure to inhibit 
irrelevant information. Barron et al. (2011) used a 3-stimulus oddball paradigm to 
understand whether off-task thought was linked to lower processing of task events 
regardless of their relevance to the goal, or whether the attenuation was specific to 
task-relevant information. The 3-stimulus oddball task typically comprises the 
presentation of task-relevant infrequent targets (requiring a response) in a train of 
frequent stimuli that generates an ERP component called the P3b, while additional 
rare task-irrelevant stimuli are presented which generates a component known as the 
P3a. Barron and colleagues demonstrated a reduction of both the P3a and P3b, 
linked to off-task reports suggesting that the processing of all stimuli in the 
environment is reduced, rather than just those that are important to the task. 
Alternative ways to quantify external focus have been provided by analysis of 
more dynamic aspects of the EEG signal. Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) 
demonstrated increased activity of lower frequencies such as theta (4-7 Hz) and 
delta (2-3.5 Hz), and a decrease of higher frequencies, namely alpha (9-11 Hz) and 
beta (15-30 Hz), during periods of mind-wandering as compared to breath focus 
(mindful condition).  Delta power has been associated with poor cognitive ability 
(Harmony, 2013) and also linked to lower state of vigilances (Roth, 1961). These 
authors suggest that their findings highlight a reduction of alertness to the task during 
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mind-wandering experiences. In a similar vein, Baird et al. (2014) observed 
reductions in spectral power during mind-wandering compared with task focus over 
frontal regions in the alpha and beta band. Enhanced alpha activity is mostly found 
during wakeful relaxation, and reflects inhibition of task-irrelevant cortical areas 
(Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007). In contrast, beta band activity is related to 
active concentration and maintenance of current cognitive states (Engel & Fries, 
2010), together enabling the efficient treatment of external input (For frequency 
bands functional significance, see Britton et al., 2016). Braboszcz and Delorme 
(2011) outlined an additional layer of analyses by considering the impact of meta-
cognitive processes. The moment where participants consciously realise their mind 
has been wandering is central as it allows the redirection of attention toward the task. 
Findings revealed that this process of refocus was related to an increase of the alpha 
peak frequency and a long-lasting increase in alpha power. Considering that peaks of 
alpha frequency are thought to represent a state of “cognitive preparedness” 
(Angelakis, Lubar, Stathopoulou, & Kounios, 2004), and that alpha power has been 
linked to working memory (Jensen, Gelfand, Kounios, & Lisman, 2002), the authors 
suggest that together the peak of alpha and its general increase in power may be 
markers of attention shifts from an internal focus on self-generated information, to 
external information relevant to the external task. 
Together, these EEG and ERP findings provide a useful way to quantify 
whether experience is internally or externally focused. Off-task thought is linked to 
reductions in the cortical processing of the environment at a very early stage and 
both task-relevant and unrelated sensory information are processed in less detail. 
Additionally, the processing of an external input is less stable and this is 
accompanied by a decrease in the neural efficiency of task-related actions. 
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Collectively, this suggests that when people are off-task their cortex is responding 
less to environmental input, a pattern that is described as perceptual decoupling 
(Smallwood, 2013). Although the relationship between evoked responses and 
patterns of experience are relatively well understood, the association between 
patterns of oscillatory activity and experience is less well understood. In Box 1 we 
present a set of possible hypotheses regarding potential relationships between 
different patterns of oscillatory activity and different aspects of experience.  
4. Quantifying the processes underlying different types of experience  
A second area in which neuroimaging research has the potential to propel our 
understanding of ongoing thought is through the ability to determine differences in 
types of ongoing thought, and these studies have often used fMRI. Contemporary 
accounts argue that the content of ongoing thought is heterogeneous in terms of both 
its content, and its relationship to functional outcomes (Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013). For example, there is a wide range of things that people think about 
when their mind wanders, reflecting variables such as temporal focus, affective state, 
and interest (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). For example, mind-wandering can 
sometimes focus on past or future events (Baird et al., 2011), may involve thoughts 
relevant to one’s self or others (Baird et al., 2011; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 
2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013), it may be positive or negative in 
valence (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013), and can either be intentional or 
unintentional in origin (Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016). This wide variety of 
different patterns of thought requires the assessment of multiple experiential factors. 
In addition, evidence suggests that patterns of ongoing thought are also variable in 
terms of the associated functional outcomes. For example, while some studies have 
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shown that periods of mind-wandering occurrence has a negative impact on mood 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and cognitive task performance, such as sustained 
attention, working memory capacity, and reading comprehension (Mrazek et al., 
2012; Smallwood et al., 2008), others have revealed the positive effects of task 
unrelated thought, for example, enabling future planning (Baird et al., 2011; Medea et 
al., 2016), creativity (Baird et al., 2012), social problem solving (Ruby, Smallwood, 
Engen, et al., 2013), and fostering a more patient style of making decisions 
(Smallwood et al., 2013).  
As shown above, there are multiple patterns of experience that participants 
report in the off-task state, however, it remains to be seen whether these should be 
considered unique categories of experience or not. In this context, neuroimaging can 
help address this uncertainty since it could help determine whether different patterns 
of experience may depend on similar or different neural processes. In this way, 
combining self-reported information with modern neuroimaging techniques would 
provide a layer of objective data that can inform our understanding of the best way to 
categorise subjective states. For example, neuroimaging techniques provide covert 
measures of underlying cognitive processing, thus helping to determine whether 
variable mind-wandering frequency, content, and outcomes are associated with 
parallel physical differences in the brain. Moreover, advances in machine learning 
offer the potential to infer the heterogeneity of different experiential states directly 
from the combined decompositions of neural and self-reported data (Vatansever et 
al., 2017; Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018; Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). In one of these 
studies, Wang and colleagues used canonical correlation analysis to perform a 
conjoined decomposition of the reports that participants made at the end of a 
scanning session with the functional connectivity of the whole brain at rest. This 
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identified a pattern of individual variation that correlated with both thoughts related to 
an individuals’ current concerns as well as reduced connectivity within task-positive 
systems important for external attention and was linked to poor performance on 
measures of intelligence and control (Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018). Interestingly these 
networks included both the ventral and dorsal attention networks, which are both 
thought to be important in the generation of stronger evoked response linked to 
attention (e.g. the P3). 
A large proportion of previous fMRI research has focussed on the default mode 
network (DMN) which tends to show a pattern of deactivation in externally 
demanding tasks that depend upon the efficient processing of external information 
(for review see Raichle, 2015). While initial views of this network emphasised a role 
that was opposed to tasks (i.e. Fox et al., 2005), it is now recognised that this view is 
too simplistic. While the DMN is active during off-task thought (Allen et al., 2013; 
Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Hasenkamp, Wilson-
Mendenhall, Duncan, & Barsalou, 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, 
& D’Argembeau, 2011), it is also active in many other situations involving 
autobiographical memory, semantic processing, planning of the personal future, 
imagination, theory of mind, and self-reflection (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Spreng & 
Grady, 2009; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2008; for a review of DMN functions see Andrews‐
Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). 
More recently, Sormaz and colleagues used experience sampling to show that the 
DMN plays an important role in the level of detail in representations of task-relevant 
information in working memory (Sormaz et al., 2018). Together these studies show 
that a simple account mapping the DMN to the off-task state is unwarranted because 
it is likely to be important for task relevant states as well. 
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Another way to understand neural processes linked to different patterns of 
ongoing thought, is through a specific comparison to brain activity of experiences that 
are produced spontaneously with those that are part of a task (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015). One assumption of contemporary component process accounts of 
the mind-wandering state is that the experience engages systems that can also be 
engaged as part of an external task. A recent study by Tusche et al. (2014) supports 
this assumption. They used multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) to identify 
similarities between spontaneous and task-related examples of positive and negative 
thoughts. They found similar patterns of activation (i.e. medial orbitofrontal cortex; 
mOFC) for both the task-generated and task-free affective experiences, which 
suggests commonalities in the nature of thoughts regardless of the way they have 
been initiated. Ultimately, the use of MVPA enables researchers to draw parallels 
between task-induced and naturally occurring affective experiences and to test 
important features of contemporary accounts of how patterns of ongoing thought 
emerge. Another area in which we might expect to find overlap between the neural 
processes engaged during ongoing thought and those engaged in tasks may be in 
the domain of creativity. There is a robust correlation between variation in types of 
off-task thought and more creative solutions to problems (Baird et al., 2012; 
Smeekens & Kane, 2016; Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). More generally, a key finding 
from the Christoff et al. (2009) study was the co-activation of both the default and 
executive networks. In general, the executive and default networks are thought to act 
in opposition to each other so that when the executive network becomes activated, 
the default network is deactivated or actively suppressed (Weissman, Roberts, 
Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006). However, there are psychological phenomena including 
creativity, where co-activation of these systems has been observed. For example, co-
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activation of those networks occurs during creative thinking (Beaty, Benedek, 
Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Beaty et al., 2018; Kounios et al., 2008, 2006), 
autobiographical planning (Spreng et al., 2010), during naturalistic film viewing 
(Golland et al., 2007) which is related to immersive simulative mental experiences 
(Mar & Oatley, 2008), and periods of decision making when information from memory 
can guide decision making (Konishi et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2017). What is 
common about these examples is the requirement that goal relevant cognition must 
rely on information from memory, and it may be important in the future to understand 
the overlap between neural activity reflecting retrieval of information from memory 
with patterns observed during periods of ongoing thought, especially given evidence 
that more efficient memory processes are associated with the off-task state (Poerio 
et al., 2017). 
5. Individual variation. 
A final area in which neuroimaging has advanced our understanding of ongoing 
thought is in the area of individual differences. These approaches depend on 
connectivity analyses that estimate the connections between different brain regions 
which can be derived from both the functional (i.e. the BOLD signal) and the 
structural domain (i.e. white matter connections, for a comprehensive review, see 
Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). These studies are useful in understanding the neural basis 
of different patterns of ongoing thought since they allow patterns of population 
variation in different aspects of ongoing thought to be embedded in the functional 
organisation of the cortex. Importantly, these studies use descriptions of the brain at 
rest to describe each individual’s neural architecture, and so only require 5-15 
minutes of brain activity to be recorded. While these studies cannot reveal the neural 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
22 
 
descriptions of the momentary changes that occur as the mind wanders, they do 
provide a cost-effective way to generate individual differences in spontaneous 
thought that have sufficient sample sizes to be generalizable to the underlying 
population, an issue that is increasingly important for both psychology and 
neuroscience (Yarkoni, 2009).  
A growing body of individual difference studies have begun to use an individual 
difference approach to pinpoint the neural architecture underlying different patterns of 
ongoing thought, utilising both structural and functional descriptions of ongoing 
thought. Karapanagiotidis et al. (2017) assessed whether individual variability in the 
content of their thoughts related to markers of structural connectivity. Structural 
connectivity using DTI identified a temporo-limbic white matter region, highly 
connected to the right hippocampus, in people who spontaneously engaged in more 
mental time travel. Functional connectivity analyses revealed a temporal correlation 
of the right hippocampus with the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex, a core region of 
the DMN, which was modulated by inter-individual variation in mental time travel. 
Therefore, spontaneous thoughts experienced during mind wandering, especially 
those linked to mental time travel, seems to be underlined by the hippocampus and 
its integration to the DMN. This assumption has been highlighted by evidence that 
individuals with hippocampal amnesia are less likely to experience off-task episodes 
with rich experiential content (McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2018). 
Other studies have looked at the relationship between the functional 
architecture of the mind and population variation in different types of ongoing 
thought. Smallwood et al. (2016) explored whether individual differences in the 
functional architecture of the cortex predicted the nature of spontaneous thoughts. 
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Results illustrated that the functional connectivity of the temporal poles with the 
posterior cingulated cortex was predictive of both greater mental time travel involving 
social agents and unpleasant task-unrelated-thoughts. Elsewhere, the role of the 
temporal pole in mental time travel and social cognition have been reported (Pehrs et 
al., 2015; Pehrs, Zaki, Taruffi, Kuchinke, & Koelsch, 2018). Smallwood et al., (2016) 
highlighted that connectivity from the hippocampus to the posterior cingulate cortex 
predicted greater specificity to thoughts, thus giving further insight into the key role 
that the hippocampus may play when connected to specific nodes of the DMN. It is 
possible that the role of the hippocampus is particularly important in the future 
planning that often takes place during spontaneous thought. Medea et al. (2016) 
demonstrated that our capacity to develop more concrete descriptions of both goals 
and aspects of our knowledge is supported by brain networks centred on the 
hippocampus. They found that greater coupling between the hippocampus and more 
dorsal medial frontal regions, including the pre-supplementary motor area, was a 
specific predictor of the generation of more concrete goals. Other authors have 
explored the relationship between ongoing thought and systems that are important in 
tasks. Work by Wang and colleagues (2018) for example, demonstrated that task 
negative aspects of ongoing thought may be linked to reduced patterns of 
connectivity with systems involved in external attention. In addition, Golchert et al. 
(2017) demonstrated that connectivity between the executive and default networks 
was greater for individuals who described having greater control over the off-task 
experience. A comparable pattern was observed by Mooneyham et al. (2016)  who 
found that individuals reporting higher trait levels of mind-wandering in daily life 
showed more connectivity between executive and default systems, a pattern that 
may reflect the fact that the majority of mind-wandering easy tasks (such as rest) is 
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deliberate (Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016). The combined use of functional and 
structural connectivity highlights further the heterogeneity of mind-wandering 
experiences, as specific characteristics are repetitively associated with variations in 
neural recruitments.   
6. Future directions. 
Neuroimaging approaches have been critical in helping improve neurocognitive 
accounts of different patterns of ongoing thought. In particular, the triangulation of 
both measures of self-report with objective indices of information processing provided 
by neuroimaging in quantifying the nature of internal focus, as well as helping 
address the reality of different aspects of ongoing thought. In the future it seems 
likely that these measures will also be important in determining the dynamics that 
underpin ongoing experience, as well as refining our knowledge of the causal roles 
that different systems can play.  
One important area of research is understanding the nature of neural dynamic 
during different aspects of experience (Kucyi, 2017). EEG phase differences are 
used to measure the directional flow of information between two EEG electrodes 
sites. Using mean phase coherence, Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, and Goldstein 
(2014) found that DMN deactivation during a task, compared to a resting baseline, 
was related to lower gamma and increased alpha mean phase coherence. Lower 
gamma band activity could reflect the decoupling of the control/executive system with 
the DMN, whereas the increase in alpha band activity could reflect the coupling of 
this system with task-activated network. Additionally, a recent study investigated the 
neuronal differences between thoughts triggered either internally or externally using a 
correlation coefficient measure, which is similar to coherence measures (Godwin, 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
25 
 
Morsella, & Geisler, 2016). Findings revealed increased functional connectivity over 
parietal areas within the alpha band for internal compared to external thoughts. This 
was suggested to reflect a neural mechanism that enables the suppression of 
externally focused attention in favour of internally directed processes. It is possible 
that this method could be fruitfully employed in the examination of the processing of 
perceptual decoupling that it is thought to be important during periods of internally 
focused attention (Smallwood, 2013). 
It is also possible to understand dynamical properties of neural signals using 
fMRI. A recent study demonstrated that states of mind-wandering elicited positive 
functional connectivity between regions of both the executive and default networks 
(Mooneyham et al., 2016). Here the use of dynamic functional connectivity enabled 
the identification of different states of functional connectivity across known networks. 
This measure is based on the principle that functional connectivity relationships 
between brain regions and networks are dynamically influenced by time, and reflects 
changes in cognitive states (Calhoun, Miller, Pearlson, & Adalı, 2014; Hutchison et 
al., 2013). This suggests that the relationship between different brain areas as they 
change over time may be an indicator of different cognitive states. Thus, dynamic 
functional connectivity measures may play an important role in future studies of 
periods of ongoing thought (for a review see Kucyi et al., 2017). 
The majority of studies have looked at the neural basis of ongoing thought using 
EEG and FMRI and while these methods are important in describing the association 
between different states and patterns of neural activation, however, these data are 
correlational. In the future, it will be important to combine these methods with 
approaches such as Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (tMS) and Transcranial Direct 
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Current Stimulation (tDCS). A few studies (Axelrod, Rees, Lavidor, & Bar, 2015; 
Axelrod, Zhu, & Qiu, 2018; Boayue et al., 2019; Kajimura, Kochiyama, Nakai, Abe, & 
Nomura, 2016; Kajimura & Nomura, 2015) have explored the role that different large 
scale systems play in the maintenance and initiation of different patterns of thought. 
A related technique has explored the effects of lesions on patterns of ongoing 
thought. For example, lesions to the hippocampus reduce the episodic content of 
periods of mind-wandering (McCormick et al., 2018), while Bertossi and Ciaramelli 
(2016) demonstrated that lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex reduce future 
thinking during the off-task state. These methods are important because they allow 
researchers to test causal accounts of the role of neural functions in periods of self-
generated thought. Other studies have looked at the cognitive consequences of 
stimulation of aspects of the default mode network (Foster & Parvizi, 2017), and it 
would be useful to extend these types of methods to patterns of thought measured 
using experience sampling. As we gain a more conclusive account of the neural 
systems that support different patterns of ongoing thought, methods of non-invasive 
brain stimulation are likely to be increasingly important in fine-tuning mechanistic 
accounts of how covert states such as mind-wandering unfold.  
Finally, it may be possible to make progress on understanding the processes 
that are important in periods of self-generated thought by testing formal models of 
how these processes emerge. The component process account (e.g. Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015) argues that periods of off-task thought may rely on the combination 
of a number of different processes, such as episodic or semantic memory, executive 
control, and emotion. This approach has been successfully employed in studies of 
the default mode network (e.g. Axelrod, Rees, & Bar, 2017) and in studies of ongoing 
experience (Poerio et al., 2017; Turnbull et al., 2019). One benefit of this approach is 
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that the introspective evidence can be combined with objective tasks data (e.g. 
measures of memory retrieval). In addition, well-specified models could be tested 
formally (Axelrod & Teodorescu, 2015; Mittner et al., 2014). 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the use of neuroimaging tools and converging methods has proven to 
be informative in the study of mind wandering. The use of ERP and EEG 
methodologies have helped demonstrate that during certain types of experience the 
perceptual processing is attenuated. In contrast, fMRI studies have provided 
evidence that different types of ongoing thought can emerge from the combination of 
different large-scale networks. Patterns of ongoing thought are a critical part of daily 
life with implications for the integrity of tasks such as driving, and has important 
implications for mental health. Accordingly, the combination of self-reported 
information with the detailed measures of neural function available hold the promise 
to shed critical light on aspects of human cognition. 
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Figure 1. Flow chart describing the analytical decisions guiding the use of neuroimaging 
technics in the investigation of ongoing thought. 
* This question can only be answered using online measure of brain activity. 
Note: ES = Expereince Sampling, MDES = Multidimentional Experience Sampling.  
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Table 1. Most useful questionnaires to use in association with resting state fMRI scan, with a description of their purpose and 
aimed population.  
Questionnaire Description Purpose  Population Examples 
Retrospective measures 
New York 
Cognition 
Questionnaire 
(Gorgolewski et 
al., 2014) 
 
31-items and 2 subscales, the first 
containing questions about the content of 
thoughts (past, future, positive, negative, 
and social experiences), the second 
containing questions about the form that 
these thoughts take (words, images, and 
thought specificity). 
Assess thoughts 
and feelings 
experienced 
during the 
performance of a 
particular task 
and at rest. 
Any age in 
adulthood. 
Patients (e.g. 
generalised anxiety 
disorder) and 
healthy participants. 
(Makovac et al., 
2018; Sanders, 
Wang, Schooler, & 
Smallwood, 2017; 
Wang, Bzdok, et al., 
2018) 
Amsterdam 
Resting state 
questionnaire  
(Diaz et al., 2013) 
50-items from which 5 factors can be 
extracted: Discontinuity of Mind, Theory of 
Mind, Self, Planning, Sleepiness, Comfort, 
and Somatic Awareness 
Assess thoughts 
and feelings 
experienced 
during rest. 
Sensitive to brain 
disorder. 
Patients (e.g. 
obsessive-
compulsive 
personality disorder) 
and healthy 
participants of any 
age in adulthood. 
(Coutinho, 
Goncalves, Soares, 
Marques, & 
Sampaio, 2016; 
Diaz et al., 2014; 
Stoffers et al., 2015) 
Resting state 
questionnaire 
(Delamillieure et 
al., 2010) 
Semi-structured questionnaire of 62-items 
composing 5 types of mental activity: visual 
mental imagery, inner language (split into 
two subtypes: inner speech and auditory 
mental imagery), somatosensory 
awareness, inner musical experience, and 
mental manipulation of numbers. 
 
Assess thoughts 
and feelings 
experienced 
during rest.  
Healthy participants 
of any age in 
adulthood. 
 
(Chou et al., 2017; 
Doucet et al., 2012; 
Hurlburt, Alderson-
Day, Fernyhough, & 
Kühn, 2015; Paban, 
Deshayes, Ferrer, 
Weill, & Alescio-
Lautier, 2018) 
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Probe and self-caught measures 
Multi-
Dimensional 
Experience 
Sampling  
(e.g. Ruby, 
Smallwood, 
Engen, et al., 
2013) 
Multiple questions used in a probe caught 
context. The first question is referencing to 
task focus and the following 12 are targeting 
characteristics such as future, past, self, 
and detailed features of the experience. 
Captures 
simultaneously 
different aspects 
of experience 
allowing their 
heterogeneity to 
be empirically 
evaluated in an 
online context. 
Any age in 
adulthood. 
Patients and healthy 
participants. 
(Golchert et al., 
2017; Konishi et al., 
2017; Medea et al., 
2016; Smallwood et 
al., 2016; Turnbull 
et al., 2019) 
 
Shape 
Expectations 
Task 
(O’Callaghan, 
Shine, Lewis, 
Andrews-Hanna, 
& Irish, 2015) 
Task with minimal external stimulation and 
without constraints to perform on a cognitive 
task. Can be implemented by thought 
probes with free report of thought content. A 
scoring system is then used to evaluate 
thought frequency and content.  
Investigate the 
frequency and 
content of mind 
wandering in the 
context of low 
cognitive 
demands. 
Healthy participants 
of any age in 
adulthood.  
Particularly relevant 
for populations with 
reduced cognitive 
resources (e.g. 
older adults, 
dementia patients). 
(Geffen et al., 2017; 
Irish, Goldberg, 
Alaeddin, 
O’Callaghan, & 
Andrews-Hanna, 
2018; O’Callaghan, 
Shine, Hodges, 
Andrews-Hanna, & 
Irish, 2017) 
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Box 1. Suggestions for future work using frequency bands. 
Frequency bands in EEG and MEG have been related to specific cognitive processes. They 
also vary across the sleep – wake continuum, with lower frequencies related to sleep or 
sleep like states and the higher frequency bands associated with high concentration and 
focus. Limited research has considered frequency bands in relation to mind-wandering 
experiences, particularly with regard to different types of experience. Here we suggest a 
number of hypotheses for future research investigating the relationship between self-
generated thoughts and oscillations in neural activity.  
The contribution of the theta band (4-7 Hz) has been evidenced during tasks involving 
working memory and episodic memory encoding and retrieval (Klimesch, 1999; Mitchell, 
McNaughton, Flanagan, & Kirk, 2008; Sauseng, Klimesch, Schabus, & Doppelmayr, 2005). 
Particularly, this frequency band has been linked on multiple occasion to activity in the 
hippocampus (for a review see Buzsáki, 2002). Since studies suggest that memory 
processes are important in self-generated thought (e.g. Poerio et al., 2017) it is possible that 
theta activity could reflect the role of memory representations in periods of self-generated 
thought.  
The alpha band (8-12 Hz) is considered the dominant frequency band in adults and a striking 
increase in activity can be seen upon eyes closing. Enhanced alpha frequency band 
oscillation is suggested to reflect inhibition of task-irrelevant cortical areas (Klimesch et al., 
2007). It is possible that high levels of alpha activity could reflect the process of perceptual 
decoupling that is thought to be important in internal states.   
Lastly, higher frequency bands are good indicators of task-relevant treatment of information. 
Beta (13-29 Hz) activity, for example, is an indicator of concentration and is associated with 
focus and alertness, enabling the maintenance of a status quo (Engel & Fries, 2010). Less is 
known about the functionality of the gamma band (>30 Hz), yet, research seems to highlight 
its implication in higher order processing and the binding of higher cognitive functions (Başar-
Eroglu, Strüber, Schürmann, Stadler, & Başar, 1996). It is thus possible that gamma activity 
may help bind together patterns of self-generated thought.  
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Highlights 
Converging methods should be further used to study self-generated thoughts.  
Combining MDES to neuroimaging enables the investigation of thought heterogeneity.  
ERP and EEG measures enable quantification of the switch toward an internal focus. 
Connectivity measures target individual differences in off-task thoughts.  
